Zephyr to Los Angeles: Revisited
Commentary by Russ Jackson NOTE: This article was written in 1997; some schedule lengthening adjustments have been made in the meantime, but the basic schedule and justification arguments remain valid. RailPAC still advocates this schedule enhancement to maximize travel opportunities between Northern and Southern California, and it is based on the success of Southern Pacific's Lark train which operated on about the same schedule into the 1960's. In 2002 the merchandising of an overnight "hotel on rails" seems like a natural, and augments the very successful Amtrak Coast Starlight by putting an additional train on this route. When equipment and financing are available RailPAC urges this as one of the first of the train service additions to Amtrak's national system trains, with minimal state of California dollars required. This plan was under serious consideration in the 1998, but as RailPAC learned, it was vetoed by the Chicago unions that staff the ZEPHYR working in conjunction with their Congressman. It's time to reconsider the plan under the new Amtrak administration and its reorganized priorities.In the December, 1993, issue of the WESTERN RAIL PASSENGER REVIEW (93-6), Dr. Adrian Herzog of URPA and RailPAC proposed extending the California Zephyr down the Coast line to Los Angeles. Since that time this idea has had a top priority with RailPAC, even though we have yet to be successful in getting it implemented by Amtrak. Because we have so many new members, many of them in Northern California, it is time to revisit this proposal. Even though the current Zephyr no longer resembles what it was in 1993, what with the demise of the feeder Pioneer and Desert Wind, the present daily schedule makes the idea of its extension more acceptable, as timekeeping is more reliable now that these feeder trains are gone and not likely to be resumed. We also are assuming continuance of Amtrak, or some other carrier will take over the system and will be looking for expansion possibilities.
Advantages.
Four important reasons for extension of the Zephyr stand out.
- The long-needed overnight train from the Bay Area to Los Angeles can be accomplished with the addition of only one more Superliner trainset. (See tables A and B)
- Direct Los Angeles-Central Coast-Reno first class train service is instituted, and direct first class Southern/Central Coast California through train service to Utah and Colorado is reinstated.
- Amtrak can consolidate Superliner maintenance in Los Angeles, without having the sub-shop in Oakland which requires a constant exchange of mechanics and parts, most times by air, between these California cities. With the Caltrans-owned California cars exclusively being used on the CAPITOLS and SAN JOAQUINS and maintained in Oakland, Amtrak's presence is greatly reduced at this maintenance base.
- The marketing opportunity produces high revenue, particularly in Sleeping cars, with little added cost.
Operations. The proposed schedule would call for departure each way from both California cities at about 9 PM. The current ZEPHYR schedule has Train 5 arriving in Oakland at 5:40 PM. (Editor's note, in 2002 it is scheduled at 6:30) A 9 PM southbound departure would be quite reasonable. Train 6 is now scheduled for a 10:40 AM Oakland departure eastbound (In 2002 it is at 9:35 AM). If it arrived from Los Angeles by 9 AM, in sufficient time for crew change and servicing, an 11 AM departure would also be reasonable. The Coast line is under-utilized by the Union Pacific, so freight interference would be minuscule. The UP would receive revenue applicable to the Coast line that it does not now receive. There are potential interference problems with Metrolink's and Caltrain's morning commuter services which would have to be ironed out.
Below are the comparisons of where the nationwide trainsets are and would be at 12 Midnight Central time (Tables A and B) and the proposed (1997) schedule (Table C).
TABLE A
CURRENT SCHEDULE: 6 TRAINSETS
10 PM PST | 11PM MST | 12 M CST
| |
Location and | |
Direction | |
of travel Elko, NV | Provo, UT Wray, CO | Omaha, NE Chicago
| |
Oakland o----- o>------ | <o------ o>------ | <o------ o
trainset 1 2 | 3 4 | 5 6
TABLE B
CURRENT SCHEDULE: ADDING LOS ANGELES, 7 TRAINSETS
| |
Oakland |----- o>------ | <o------ o>------ | <o------ o
| 3 | 4 5 | 6 7
San Jose \o/ 2 | |
| Equipment utilization is improved by having only
Simi /o\ 1 the trainset in Chicago out of service overnight.
| It would still be out of service 23 hours, while
Los Angeles the L.A. set is out 12 rather than 17 in Oakland.
TABLE C
PROPOSED SCHEDULE (Based on 1997 timetable) Daily Daily Train 5 (Read Down) Train 6 (Read Up) 3:05 P Dp Chicago Ar 4:20 P 12:31 A Dp Omaha Dp 6:57 A 9:35 A Dp Denver Dp 8:47 P 1:05 A Dp Salt Lake City Dp 5:15 A 10:06 A Dp Reno Dp 5:45 P 5:40 P Ar Oakland Dp 10:40 A 9:00 P Dp Oakland Ar 9:00 A 3:00 A Dp San Luis Obispo Dp 3:00 A 9:00 A Ar Los Angeles Dp 9:00 P
Disadvantages.
With the Zephyr being an Amtrak Intercity train running on Amtrak West's main line, intra-SBU jurisdictional responsibility would be a bureaucratic roadblock to implementation. While the preferred solution would be transfer of the train to Amtrak West, the obvious solution would be to have the Zephyr as we know it today continue as an Intercity train, with the Los Angeles-Oakland segment becoming an Amtrak West responsibility using the same equipment. Amtrak West President, Gil Mallery, told RailPAC's Editor in November, 1997, he fears the operational reliability of Oakland arrivals particularly in the winter. While a potential problem, surely the west/southbound schedule can be flexible enough that the revenue potential exceeds these fears. (Editor's note: In 2002 the SBU boundaries have been changed, so this is no longer the problem it was in 1997.)
Costs.
Another problem would be the Amtrak perception that costs would exceed revenue. With Amtrak's current fixation on fully allocated costs that might be true. But, if the incremental costs of operating this train are figured correctly, potential revenue vastly exceeds those costs. Gil Mallery was quoted (in 1997) as saying $1 million in savings could be estimated by this plan. Further allocation of fixed costs of operating the national headquarters and allocations of NEC costs "somewhere" as fully allocated costs would not be necessary. The San Luis Obispo station operating hours would require a new position, one which could be divided by also staffing the busy Grover Beach station morning departure time. At the staffed stations in Santa Barbara, Salinas, and San Jose hours would be adjusted slightly to accommodate this train. Only on-board crew costs, fuel, payments to the UP, and a small charge for administration need to be added. Crews of trains arriving at Emeryville in the morning or evening would be responsible for making up Sleeping cars before arrival, just as they are now. The crews coming on board at Emeryville would only staff cars with passengers going southbound, while other cars would deadhead. Most important, Maintenance costs at Los Angeles would be spread over more trains, and backup equipment would be more available throughout a larger Superliner pool.
Revenue.
Using the present (1997) fares on the Coast Starlight between Los Angeles and Oakland, and rounding off somewhat, assume that 15 Sleeping Car passengers (that's each bedroom in one car single occupancy) paid $140 per round trip, that brings in $2250 per trip; times two daily trains, it brings in $1,642,500 per year. If 70 Coach seats were sold at $42 per trip, its revenue becomes $2940 per trip and $2,146,200 per year. Add it together and just two cars running each way bring in $3,788,700 in additional revenue to Amtrak per year. Double it for two filled cars of each type, which is not an unreasonable expectation.
